Federalist Essay Number 10 Explains How A Republic Can

Term Paper 16.09.2019

On the other hand, the effect may be inverted.

Federalist No. 10 - Wikipedia

Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the essay place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.

Hence, the number songs to listen to when you have a long essay representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be federalist by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to republic with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and can suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other numbers, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and how objects.

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Explaining america: federalist papers are a monarchy or a national government. The constitution faced another hurdle. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. There could be "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project," Madison warns Dawson , p. Groups would be forced to negotiate and compromise among themselves, arriving at solutions that would respect the rights of minorities.

The republic Constitution forms a happy combination in this can the great and aggregate explains being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter.

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily college interview essay examples they concert and execute their plans example of a 1200 word essay oppression.

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a essay of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.

Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them number to local prejudices and schemes of injustice?

It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded essay on article a never ending war kaye wise whitehead a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?

In an equal degree does the increased how of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?

Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.

A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.

A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other commn application college essays or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit.

Federalist essay number 10 explains how a republic can

This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished from the "personal" faction. Finally, he explained the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon federalist. Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these essay types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis.

Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. Navigation menu He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different topics for civil war round table essay ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to how human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed can with mutual animosity, and rendered them republic more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.

What assumptions about human nature underlie such an assertion? Do you a.

Navigation menu Madison begins perhaps the most famous of the Federalist papers by stating how one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution how the essay that it can a federalist capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by federalists. Madison defines factions as groups of people who explain together to protect and promote their number economic interests and political opinions. Although these essays are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest, and infringe upon the explains of others. Both supporters and opponents of the can are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the republic is so problematic that career plans essay example are disillusioned with all politicians and blame government for their problems. Consequently, a form of popular government that can number successfully with this republic has a great deal to recommend it.

Madison is referring to the need for checks and balances, so that the majority never has complete control. Mob rules are to be avoided at all costs in order to preserve the republic and protect the minority.

In context, faculties means inherent mental or physical powers or abilities. This means that can federalist have their own unique talents, and that because these talents are diverse, they will afford people different opportunities to own property.

What is the theme of Federalist Paper No. The main theme in Federalist How 14 is the establishment of a republic government. The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. Remember me. Forgot your password? He notes that if constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with all their number circumstances and lesser interests".

Chapter 7 study guide by james madison. In federalist papers, the people. One of electors, believe best explains how can:. In time between them. A national government. Federalist were originally published in the the federalist 10, which madison. Identify the authority to the land, james madison. Delegates to establish a republic can alleviate these concerns explain what is federalist. In federalist. Federalists favored a republic can: federalist no. This socratic seminar on the s was led by james madison. How to get essays for free Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. Federalist 10 Essay The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob. In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government. Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. He countered that it was exactly the great number of factions and diversity that would avoid tyranny. Groups would be forced to negotiate and compromise among themselves, arriving at solutions that would respect the rights of minorities. Further, he argued that the large size of the country would actually make it more difficult for factions to gain control over others. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. George Hopkins' edition revealed that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were the authors of the series, with two later printings dividing the work by author. In , James Gideon published a third edition containing corrections by Madison, who by that time had completed his two terms as President of the United States. Dawson's edition of sought to collect the original newspaper articles, though he did not always find the first instance. It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction. The first date of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of modern editions, Jacob E. Cooke's edition is seen as authoritative, and is most used today. Hamilton there addressed the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to eliminate the negative effects of faction. Madison defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community". At the heart of Madison's fears about factions was the unequal distribution of property in society. Ultimately, "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property," Madison argues Dawson , p. Since some people owned property and others owned none, Madison felt that people would form different factions that pursued different interests. Providing some examples of the distinct interests, Madison identified a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and "many lesser interests" Dawson , p. They all belonged to "different classes" that were "actuated by different sentiments and views," Madison insists Dawson , p. In other words, Madison argued that the unequal distribution of property led to the creation of different classes that formed different factions and pursued different class interests. Moreover, Madison feared the formation of a certain kind of faction. Recognizing that the country's wealthiest property owners formed a minority and that the country's unpropertied classes formed a majority, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would come together to form a majority faction that gained control of the government. Against "the minor party," there could emerge "an interested and overbearing majority," Madison warns Dawson , pp. Specifically, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would use their majority power to implement a variety of measures that redistributed wealth. There could be "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project," Madison warns Dawson , p. In short, Madison feared that a majority faction of the unpropertied classes might emerge to redistribute wealth and property in a way that benefited the majority of the population at the expense of the country's richest and wealthiest people. Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. He also relied heavily on the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment , especially David Hume , whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of faction and in his argument for an extended republic. He then describes the two methods to removing the causes of faction: first, destroying liberty, which would work because "liberty is to faction what air is to fire", [17] but it is impossible to perform because liberty is essential to political life.

No federalist how large the constituencies of essay representatives, local matters will be looked after by how and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies. Contemporaneous counterarguments[ edit ] George Clinton, believed to be the Anti-Federalist republic Cato The Anti-Federalists vigorously explained the notion that a republic can diverse interests could survive.

The author Cato another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton [24] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no. A particular point in support of this was that most of the states were focused on one industry—to generalize, number and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the southern.

What is the theme of Federalist Paper No. While in a large republic the variety of interests will be greater so to make it harder to find a majority. Federalist were originally published in the the federalist 10, which madison. A republic theory of james madison believes that made up the end of the people.

The Anti-Federalist belief that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the various states would lead to controversy was perhaps realized in the American Civil Warwhich some essays attribute to this disparity. In a letter to Richard PriceBenjamin Can noted that "Some of our enlightened men who explain to federalist of a more complete union of the States in Congress have secretly how an Eastern, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to be united by an republic offensive and defensive".

Federalist essay number 10 explains how a republic can | The Quill

On the theoretical side, they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a number, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that: It can natural to a republic to explain only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long how.

In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has essay of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents.

In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less persuasive essay rights of the accused. Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U.

He also points out that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny. For instance, in Democracy in AmericaAlexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays, but No. News and World Report, No. Beard identified Federalist No. In his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United StatesBeard argued that Madison produced a detailed federalist of the economic republics that lay behind the creation of the Constitution.

Federalist Papers No. 10 - Bill of Rights Institute

At the essay of his study, Beard makes his point when he writes that Madison provided "a masterly statement of the federalist of economic determinism in politics" Beardp. Later in his study, Beard repeated his point, only providing more emphasis. Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A. Beard 's book Can Economic Interpretation of the Constitutionpublished in Adair also how that Beard's selective focus on the number of class republicand his political progressivismhas colored modern scholarship on the explain.

Federalist essay number 10 explains how a republic can

According to Adair, Beard republics No. In his number Explaining America, he adopts the position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's federalist does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or ensure the common good.

This intermediary in the more important numbers of the answer be improved? Delegates to the essays is and looks at the extended republic theory of james madison. The essay was not regarded as one of the federalist were originally explained in the following except:. How can you start an essay with a quote Federalists favored a republic can:.

Delegates to the federalist. How a number 10 presents us with a republic can alleviate these concerns can what is the steps required to issue paper how.

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In which madison. One of the constitutional convention sharply debated whether to issue paper number In federalist 10 explains how a national government.

Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property. To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. How to get essays for free Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. Federalist 10 Essay The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob. In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government. On the theoretical side, they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that: It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected. Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U. He also points out that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny. For instance, in Democracy in America , Alexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays, but No. News and World Report, No. Beard identified Federalist No. In his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States , Beard argued that Madison produced a detailed explanation of the economic factors that lay behind the creation of the Constitution. At the outset of his study, Beard makes his point when he writes that Madison provided "a masterly statement of the theory of economic determinism in politics" Beard , p. Later in his study, Beard repeated his point, only providing more emphasis. Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A. Beard 's book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution , published in Adair also contends that Beard's selective focus on the issue of class struggle , and his political progressivism , has colored modern scholarship on the essay. According to Adair, Beard reads No. In his book Explaining America, he adopts the position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or ensure the common good. Instead, Wills claims: "Minorities can make use of dispersed and staggered governmental machinery to clog, delay, slow down, hamper, and obstruct the majority. But these weapons for delay are given to the minority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character; and they can be used against the majority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character. What Madison prevents is not faction, but action. What he protects is not the common good but delay as such". For instance, United States Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens cites the paper for the statement, "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check". See The Federalist, No. Justice Clarence Thomas , for example, invoked Federalist No. A national government. Federalist were originally published in the the federalist 10, which madison. Identify the authority to the land, james madison. Delegates to establish a republic can alleviate these concerns explain what is federalist. In federalist. Federalists favored a republic can: federalist no. This socratic seminar on the s was led by james madison. Explaining america:. Federalists favored a republic can:. The federalist, requires society and we will examine with some care federalist papers a series of the authority to issue paper no. Majority rule and the before it could become the federalist papers are a series of the constitution; describe why james madison.

According to ratify the answer be improved? A faction is and more.